This paper presents empirical evidence on firms' decisions to cooperate in R&D and the extent to which government sponsored R&D programs increase cooperation. Using a sample of firms from the Spanish innovation survey we jointly estimate the determinants of firm participation in R&D programs and of choice of cooperation partners. We find that (i) firms participating in national and European programs have different profiles, suggesting program complementarity; (ii) private-private and publicprivate cooperation are associated on average with firms with different characteristics, and (iii) national R&D programs seem to have a positive effect on all types of cooperation, but especially on public-private partnerships.
Introduction.
Cooperative agreements to perform R&D activities have been increasing over the last twenty years in OECD countries. Several indicators are revealing: the share of patent co-applications in triad patent families has almost doubled since 1980, and the number of strategic technology alliances has almost tripled on average (OECD 2002) . Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas (2000) also document this trend. The Community Innovation Survey, conducted in EU member countries, provides additional evidence of the importance of R&D partnerships and its variation across firms, industries and countries. According to CIS3, 1 on average 17% of manufacturing firms with innovative activities indicate they had cooperation agreements in 1998-2000; the share is significantly higher for large firms (61%). Partnerships with suppliers or customers are as frequent as partnerships with universities. Cross-country differences are significant.
In Finland 22% of SMEs in the manufacturing industries declared being involved in cooperative agreements in 2000, while in Spain or Italy barely 3 % of SMEs did.
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At the same time, public support programs to promote R&D cooperation have been implemented since the eighties in the US, Japan and the EU. The European Union's successive European Framework Programs are a significant example. Participation rates into these programs vary widely across EU member countries. In per capita terms, Denmark, Finland and Sweden had the highest participation rates in Framework
Program 5, while Spain and Italy were among the lowest. These observations raise a number of issues, such as the measurement of private and social benefits of R&D cooperation, identification of obstacles to cooperation in different countries or industries, determinants of the choice of partners, and evaluation of effects of R&D policies supporting cooperation.
In this paper we investigate empirical patterns of cooperation and the relationship between cooperation and participation in public R&D programs at the firm level in a middle-income country. We address three issues. We first compare the determinants of firms' participation in national and European level R&D programs. To the best of or knowledge the extent of ex post complementarity between programs has not been previously studied. We then study the association between some firm characteristics and choice of cooperation partners. In line with previous work, we test whether some firm characteristics, such as the size of the firm or the range of its market, affect the choice of partners. This may reveal some possible causes of cross-country differences in R&D cooperation rates. Finally, we test whether participation in R&D programs has any effect on firms' choice of partners, taking into account that participation is endogenously determined.
We use both parametric and non-parametric methods and a large sample of Catalan manufacturing firms to study these issues. We find that (i) firms participating in national and European programs have different profiles, suggesting that both types of programs are complementary; (ii) private-private and public-private cooperation are associated with firms with different characteristics, as found in studies for other countries, and (iii) national R&D programs seem to have a positive effect on all types of cooperation, but especially on public-private partnerships.
The paper is structured as follows. In the remainder of this section we provide a brief review of closely related work. We present our data in section 2. In section 3 we describe some hypotheses about firm characteristics and their relationship with participation and cooperation choices. In section 4 we discuss the empirical framework and results, and conclude in section 5.
Theoretical and empirical research has approached R&D cooperation from a variety of perspectives, and the stock of literature is quite extensive. We focus here on a selection of work dealing specifically with the determinants of partner choice and with the role of public R&D programs on those choices. Of particular interest are those studies that use firm level data obtained through the Community Innovation Survey conducted in EU countries.
4 Belderbos et al. (2003) are the first to use panel data and estimation methods that allow them to test for complementarities between types of partnerships, and to address the simultaneity issue that typically arises between cooperation and R&D effort. 5 The types of partnership considered are horizontal, vertical and private-public cooperation. Two waves of the Dutch CIS survey (1994 -1996 ) and (1996 1994-1996. 6 In that case the most influential factor on the probability that a firm will set up this type of collaboration is receiving R&D subsidies, followed by having applied for patents.
Finally, Bayona, García and Huerta (2003) Participation in international R&D programs increases horizontal cooperation, while it does not affect vertical cooperation.
The common result from these studies is that firm characteristics affect the choice of partners, suggesting that different types of cooperation tend to benefit different types of firms. However, the effects of particular characteristics and, most important from a policy perspective, participation in public R&D programs do not seem to be robust across samples. Table 1 highlights some of the differences and similarities found in those studies. Possible explanations for these differences are the treatment of endogeneity of R&D subsidies, as well as not accounting for possible program heterogeneity. These are the issues we set out to investigate.
[Insert Table 1 about here] Veugelers (2002 ), Tether (2002 . 6 The sample includes firms from several European countries: France (about 45% of the sample), Germany (10%), Ireland (4%) and Spain (42%). 7 They use the Spanish Innovation Survey for [1994] [1995] [1996] . In this and a companion work, Bayona et al (2001) find that the probability of engaging in any type of cooperation increases with firm size and own R&D experience. Third, when out-coming R&D spillovers are a serious concern, R&D partnerships provide a mechanism to internalize them. Finally R&D cooperation may allow partners to increase market power in the product market. The choice of different types of partnerships will be related to the importance of each of these factors for different firms and to the nature of their R&D projects.
Data.
14 Twenty seven percent of firms in our sample are foreign owned, where foreign owned means having more than a 50% share in ownership. 15 A discussion of sample representativity and extensive description can be found in Fernández-Ribas (2003) . 16 For a recent survey, see Caloghirou, Ioannides and Vonortas (2003) .
One important trait of R&D and innovation projects is the extent of novelty pursued.
The OECD's Oslo Manual guidelines, followed by standard innovation surveys, considers a range of innovation degrees. Maximum innovation occurs when it is new to the world, and minimum innovation occurs when a firm implements a new or improved product or process that is already implemented in other firms and industries. Knowing the goal of a project is vey important for understanding partnerships. Unfortunately our data do not provide this type of information, nor on indicators related to motivation for cooperation, such as measures of spillovers, costs or risks associated with R&D projects. We will assume that, on average, R&D partnerships with universities and public research centers tend to involve higher degrees of novelty and risk than privateprivate partnerships, and discuss how observed firm characteristics are expected to affect costs and benefits of each type of cooperation alliance, and therefore firms' R&D partner choice.
Most previous empirical evidence shows that firm size is a key variable for predicting whether a firm will engage in R&D. However, once a firm does R&D, it is not clear why and how size should be relevant regarding cooperation. On one hand, given a potential R&D project, smaller firms may be more likely to cooperate in order to share associated fixed costs. However, large firms may also find cooperation beneficial when potential R&D projects are very costly. Without information about the nature and scope of R&D projects, it is not possible to make a conclusive prediction on the effects of firm size. If we assume that vertical cooperation involves mostly development and technology transfer projects, while private-public cooperation tends to include a riskier research component, then we would expect SMEs to be more likely to participate in vertical agreements, and large firms more likely to participate in private-public partnerships. We use the number of employees as a measure of firm size, and expect it to have different effects on each type of partnership.
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A firm's knowledge capital is an intangible asset that can be expected to be valuable in any kind of R&D cooperation. However, to the extent that some partnerships are established precisely to facilitate technology transfer and product development, partners may be quite different in this respect. We do not have information about partner characteristics for each cooperative agreement, but it is reasonable to expect vertical cooperation agreements to involve some partners with low levels of knowledge capital.
In public-private partnerships, in contrast, we would expect firms to have a high level of knowledge capital, as they need to have absorptive capacity to benefit from university research. We define five indicators of the firm's knowledge capital related to experience, knowledge assets and human capital. Stable RD is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm allocates at least one time-person to R&D over some years.
PatSp, binary and equal to 1 if the firm has applied for patents only at the Spanish Patent Office, and PatInt, binary and equal to 1 if the firm has applied both in Spain and in some international patent office. The variable Researchers, the ratio of R&D researchers to non-R&D employees, approximates human capital intensity. We finally use the (log) average wage of R&D employees as an indicator of researcher quality.
Foreign owners have a majority stake in about one fourth of the firms in our sample. We expect subsidiaries to be more likely to engage in vertical partnerships either with the 17 Table A1 in the Appendix contains the precise definition of each variable.
mother company or with local suppliers or customers. We expect subsidiaries to be less likely, on average, to engage in private-public partnerships, because their links with the mother company allow them to access international technology markets more easily than domestic firms. We define the variable Foreign, binary and equal to 1 if foreign share in ownership was at least 50% in 1998.
The relationship between innovating and exporting has been established in the international trade literature, and empirical evidence supports the existence of a causal link from innovation to export performance. Feedback effects from exporting to innovation behavior have been less explored. We think that there are two possible reasons for feedback effects. First, exporters, being exposed to international competition, face higher pressure to innovate through all kinds of R&D strategies than non-exporters. Second, by exporting, firms gain access to a richer network of customers, suppliers or competitors than non-exporters, making international cooperation more likely. We expect exporters to be more likely to cooperate with any partner, and include the share of exports over total sales in our set of explanatory variables. 
Participation.
The distinctive trait of EU R&D programs is that they explicitly intend to encourage inter-European cooperation, and application rules state that proposed partnerships must involve firms and/or institutions from several member countries. National programs in
Spain offer different lines of funding, only a subset requiring cooperation, mostly among firms and public research organizations. We will distinguish, therefore, between EU and national level programs, as they have somewhat different goals, target different types of firms and involve different levels of application costs.
18 Table A2 shows a detailed industry composition.
What kind of firms benefit from European funding and are able to set up an international partnership? Some evidence has been provided by Hernán, Marín and Siotis (2003) , who analyze what determines firm participation in RJVs funded by either the Eureka Program or the EU Framework Program. Using a large database of firms from almost twenty European countries, they find that, among individual firm characteristics, firm size and previous participation experience increase the likelihood of participating. Industry-level characteristics are also significant, especially R&D intensity. One possible explanation for the significance of firm size is that EU programs favor large partnerships, which may be more costly to manage. Our hypothesis is that, in addition to firm size and industry type, firms that have a high level of human capital and compete in international markets will be more likely to participate in international R&D alliances.
National level R&D and innovation programs have several goals, such as increasing both business R&D expenditure and the number researchers employed by firms, promoting cooperative research between firms and universities, public research centers or technological centers, and increasing participation in international programs.
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Several lines of funding are established accordingly. Firms can decide whether to apply for funding for an individual R&D project or for a joint R&D project with other partners. Application costs are not likely to be a significant barrier in this case. Since all firms in our sample conduct R&D, we assume that most are informed about the existence of these programs and are eligible for public funding.
Obtention of funding, and hence participation status, will be mostly determined by agencies' preferences and budget. Program information delivered by national public agencies and application forms suggest that in deciding whether to fund an R&D and innovation proposal, agencies weigh its technical and commercial feasibility as well as the benefits generated for other firms and consumers. Firm size, expertise and R&D experience are likely to be associated with technical and commercial feasibility, and hence with participation. However, to the extent that a variety of market failures may affect SMEs in particular, and public agencies wish to offset them, then the relationship between firm size and probability of participation could be negative. Which effect dominates is an empirical question. We also expect national agencies to have a preference for domestic relative to foreign owned firms.
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Unobserved variables related both to firm and project characteristics, such as novelty and basicness, are likely to affect both agency's decisions and cooperation partnerships.
Empirical models and results.

Empirical framework.
Whether a firm will set up R&D and innovation agreements with certain partners, and its participation status in publicly supported R&D programs, can be modeled as a recursive system of equations where we allow participation status to affect the choice of cooperation partners, but not vice versa. Participation in EU programs, however, means 20 See MINER (1998). 21 We do not have data on rejected applicants, but just on whether a firm obtains or not public funding. Consequently we cannot really test for the agencies' selection criteria, but just test the net effect of firm characteristics on its participation status.
necessarily that firms must cooperate, so participating in those programs and cooperating are not different choices. National-level programs allow firms to apply for different types of R&D subsidies depending on whether or not firms set up a partnership with universities or other public research organizations. Consequently, we first estimate and compare the determinants of participation status in both types of programs, and then estimate the effect that participation in national level programs has on each type of cooperation settlement.
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To explain the likelihood of participating in European and national level programs, we estimate the model,
where P 22 Alternatively, we could include, in each cooperation equation, participation status in each type of program as explanatory variables. But this increases the number of instruments needed to control for endogeneity, and this is not feasible with our data set. In addition, the number of firms participating in EU programs only is too small.
where Y * j is the net benefit of establishing one of the three types of collaboration discussed above, X is a vector of individual firm characteristics, P j is the participation binary indicator, and w j is a normally distributed random error with zero mean and unit variance. We observe the indicator variable Y N j = 1(X b x j + P N d j + w j >0). Vectors X and Z N can share some variables, but identification may require exclusion restrictions.
The effect of participating, d j , on the benefits of cooperation will be overstated if omitted variables contained in w are correlated with P, the participation status. Both firm behavior and public agency selection rules may account for such correlation.
Endogeneity tests must be conducted, and, provided that identification conditions are satisfied, structural parameters in [3] can be consistently estimated through instrumental variables. If identification conditions do not hold, a non-parametric estimator of the effects of program participation can still be obtained under certain conditions. This will be discussed below.
Participation in domestic R&D programs vs. participation in EU and international programs.
We start by estimating two univariate probit models for participation status into national and EU/international programs, as well as a bivariate probit model to test for differences in their determinants. Table 4 reports the results.
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 23 On Table 4 we report marginal effects of univariate models. Results do not change significantly when we use an alternative definition for some explanatory variables. We estimate the bivariate probit model to just to test the equality of coefficients across equations and obtain an estimate of the correlation between error terms. The estimated correlation is significant, negative and close to -1.
We find that what the two types of participation have in common is a negative association with foreign ownership. Otherwise the profile of participants in each program is quite different. When testing for equality of coefficients for each variable in both equations, we clearly reject equality for firm size, having applied for international patents and belonging to low tech industries.
The single most important factor affecting participation in national R&D programs is the firm's research intensity: a one-percent increase in the ratio of R&D personnel to the total number of employees increases the probability of participation by 65%. Having experience in applying for international patents, and belonging to the chemical and pharmaceutical industries also increases the likelihood to participate. Overall, results
suggest that the firm's knowledge capital is one of the most important determinants of participation in national programs.
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In contrast, the key characteristic of participants in European programs is the extent to which the firm sells in foreign markets, as measured by export intensity. A possible interpretation for this result is that exporting firms develop links with potential international R&D partners, making partnerships easier even if the firm does not have an important own stock of researchers. Industry type, research intensity or patenting experience do not seem to have any significant effect. 25 24 These results are similar to those obtained in Blanes and Busom (2003) . 25 Our qualitative results for firm size differ from Hernán, Marín and Siotis (2003) . This may be at least partially attributed to differences in sample composition, definition of the dependent variable, which in their case includes two different types of programs (Eureka and Famework Program), as well as differences in the vector of explanatory variables.
These results, together with the significant, high and negative estimate of the correlation between the error terms in both equations can be interpreted as evidence that both types of programs are complementary, as in fact intended by national and European policymakers.
Participation in national R&D programs and Cooperation: endogeneity tests and reduced form estimates.
To study whether participation in R&D programs affects cooperation and partner choices we consider only national programs and eliminate from the sample those firms that participate in EU programs. We estimate a set of univariate probit models for cooperation as a whole and then separately for each of the three types of cooperation for which we have sufficient observations, including as explanatory variables only those we assume to be exogenous. We then include participation status as an explanatory variable treating it as exogenous. To test for endogeneity, we obtain an estimate of the correlation between participating and each of the cooperation types from a series of bivariate probit models. We finally estimate a set of cooperation models where participation status and participation residuals are included as explanatory variables, as a further test of endogeneity.
26 Table 5 shows the results of estimating the univariate probit models for cooperation and for each type of cooperation. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) show that the net effect of firm characteristics on cooperation varies with the type of cooperation. These can be interpreted as reduced form effects. We find that vertical cooperation is more likely among foreign owned, non-exporting firms, and firms that have intangible assets in the form of international patent applications, as well as high human capital. Firms in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry are less likely to cooperate with suppliers or customers. We interpret these results as suggesting that technology transfer is likely to be an important motivation of this type of cooperation.
We find that, in contrast, cooperation with public research institutions is mostly driven by research intensity: the share of researchers over non-R&D employees increases the likelihood of cooperating by 67%. We interpret this as evidence that having absorptive capacity is of utmost importance for establishing this sort of partnerships, whereas it seems to be much less important for other types. The effect of firm size is positive and significant, but small. Firms in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry are more likely to collaborate with public research institutions. Finally, other types of cooperation are more likely to be chosen by firms with high human capital, do R&D occasionally, and have applied for patents only in Spain.
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[Insert Table 5 about here]
When we include participation status in the probit models, and treat it as an additional exogenous variable, we find that all types of cooperation are positively affected.
Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) in Table 5 report the marginal effects. Being a participant becomes one of the most important variables to affect the likelihood of cooperation with public research organizations (it would increase the probability of cooperating by 25%), 26 See Wooldridge (2002) . 27 We have estimated a slightly different specification for each equation, using size, size squared, researchers and researchers squared, as explanatory variables. Results are similar. We also estimate a series of bivariate probit models for every pair of cooperation types, and find that correlation estimates are always positive and significant. Equality of coefficients across equations is rejected in all cases.
as well as with firms that are not customers, suppliers or competitors. The impact on vertical cooperation is smaller. Results for other variables remain practically unchanged except for vertical cooperation.
However, the results from the univariate estimations above will be inconsistent if the correlation between the error terms of cooperation and participation is non-zero. To test this we estimate a series of bivariate probit models for participation in national programs and each type of cooperation, where only exogenous explanatory variables are included 28 . We find that the estimated correlation of error terms in both equations is positive and significant in all cases, suggesting that there are indeed common unobserved factors. These estimated correlations, always significant, are 0.30 for vertical cooperation, 0.50 for public-private cooperation, and 0.29 for cooperation with other firms, as reported on Table 6 .
An additional test for endogeneity is obtained by estimating each cooperation equation including as explanatory variables both participation status and the residuals obtained in the estimation of participation status. Under the null hypothesis of exogeneity, the coefficients for the residuals should be zero. Our estimates are very imprecise, and turn out to be significant for only one of the equations. The problem we face here is that for identification we need at least one variable that is correlated with participation but not with cooperation. Among the variables made available to us we do not have a good candidate fulfilling this condition, so we cannot use this test in practice, nor obtain estimates of the structural model for cooperation equations. We next use an alternative method to obtain an estimate of the effect of participation on cooperation.
The effects of participation on cooperation: a non-parametric approach.
Following the methodological debate in evaluation research, mostly in the field of labor market and social policies, a number of estimators of the effects of program participation on the treated have been proposed in order to deal with the selection bias that typically arises when using non-experimental data. 29 One of these is a matching estimator based on the propensity score. In the spirit of controlled experiments, the idea is to compare the treated with an appropriate control group, using field data and controlling for non-random assignment to treatment. Its advantage in our case is that it does not involve estimating a structural model for cooperation nor relies on identification conditions. This method reduces that part of selection bias caused by correlation between observed characteristics of an individual and its treatment (participation) status. Matching estimators, however, do not deal with a second source of potential selection bias, caused by correlation between cooperation status and unobserved characteristics of cooperating firms.
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The first step of the matching method consists in finding in the sample an appropriate control group of non-participants. This amounts to estimating the probability of participating (the propensity score), and then choosing, among non-participants, only those that have the same estimated probability of participating as the sample of 29 See Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) . 30 As discussed in the previous section, the estimated correlation of unobservables in participation and cooperation status is significant in our case, so we can expect some selection bias to remain. We cannot, however, estimate its magnitude with available data.
participants. We use the specification shown on column (2) of Table 4 . 31 Table 7 shows, for five intervals of the estimated probability of participating in national R&D programs, the number of treated (participants) and of available comparable controls. For participants in each block we are able to find comparable non-participants. Thirty-seven observations are discarded for lack of match. 32 Table 8 shows the mean of firm characteristics for treated and for controls. The means of two variables are significantly different: research intensity and having applied for international patents. Inspection of the distribution of research intensity reveals that there are a higher proportion of firms with very low research intensity among non-participants, but otherwise the distributions are quite similar. As for applications for international patents, 31% of non-participants have applied, relative to 50% of participants. We will take this into account below.
The second step consists in calculating the difference in mean cooperation rates for participants and non-participants. This provides an estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated. Table 9 shows the results for each type of partnership, using two matching methods, Kernel and Stratification and three sets of treated and corresponding control groups. The first set uses all 180 treated firms and 444 controls. But as shown on Table 8 , treated and controls differ significantly in one of the variables, international patents. Therefore, we estimate treatment effects for the sub-sample of treated and controls that have applied for national and international patents, and then for the subsample that have not. We find that the effect of participating is always positive and significant, especially for cooperating with public institutions. 33 Participation seems to increase the likelihood that firms will cooperate with universities or public labs by about 28%, and the magnitude of this effect is similar whether firms have applied for patents or not. However, the effect of participation on the probability of cooperating with customers/suppliers, or with other firms, is higher if firms have applied for patents than if they have not. In both cases the effect of participating on private-private partnerships is smaller than the effect on public-private partnerships. From a policy perspective, this means that subsidizing firms that do not have certain type of intangible assets (international patent applications) will not lead on average to a significant increase in private-private partnerships.
We should keep in mind though, as discussed above, that unobserved characteristics such as the degree of basic/applied science content of an R&D project, would make a firm more likely to cooperate anyway, and that public agencies chose to fund precisely these projects. In that case our ATT estimator would be overestimating the true effect of participating.
Conclusions.
In this paper we have analyzed some determinants of firms' decisions to cooperate in R&D and to participate in government sponsored R&D programs. We distinguish between two types of R&D programs, European and national, and three types of R&D collaboration: vertical, public-private partnerships, and with other firms. We extend previous work by comparing firm participation in both R&D programs, and assessing the effect of participation in national programs on each type of R&D partnership. We use a sample of innovative Catalan firms from the Spanish innovation survey, and obtain our estimates through parametric and non-parametric methods. Our main findings are summarized as follows.
First, we find that European level and national programs are rather complementary in selecting firms. Participation in national programs is mostly related to the firm's research intensity and previous experience in patenting at both national and international levels. Participation in European level programs is not significantly related to own R&D capacity, but to the export orientation of the firm. Since these are firms that cooperate with other European firms or institutions, these results suggest that Spanish firms join partnerships mostly for technological learning purposes, where other European partners have knowledge assets. Participants in any of the programs tend to be domestic firms, and firm size is positively related to participation, but the magnitude of that effect is rather small, given that these firms do R&D.
Second, we find that the choice of cooperation partners is associated with different firm characteristics, confirming previous results. In our case, vertical cooperation is more likely among firms that sell mostly in the domestic market, are foreign subsidiaries and have applied for international patents. We interpret these results as suggesting that vertical cooperation is used as a mechanism for technology transfer. Cooperation with universities or public labs is substantially more likely when firms have own research capacity and apply for international patents, belong to the chemical and pharmaceutical industry. Firm size affects public-private partnerships, but not vertical cooperation.
Finally, cooperation with other firms (not customers, suppliers or competitors) is somewhat related to own research capacity and having applied for international patents, and involves some firms that do R&D occasionally. In summary, our results are in line with similar studies for public-private cooperation, but not for vertical cooperation.
Third, we find that participation in national programs increases the probability that a firm will cooperate with a university or a public research organization by 28%, a substantial effect. Cooperation with other firms, customers or suppliers is also increased as a result of participation if firms have knowledge assets, mostly international patents, but to a smaller extent.
Before we draw policy implications from these results we should make three observations. First, our estimates are based on cross sectional data, limiting our ability to tackle potential endogeneity of remaining explanatory variables. Second, an important proportion of variation in participation and cooperation remains unexplained.
Third, matching methods provide unbiased estimates when unobservables affecting cooperation and participation are not correlated. Our evidence suggests that this assumption is unlikely to hold in our case, but with the available data we cannot estimate the magnitude of the bias. Good instruments for participation are needed in order to estimate its effects. Further research can be productive if the design of CIS-type surveys takes into account these data needs.
With these caveats in mind, our results suggest that participation of Catalan firms in European level R&D programs may increase if more firms compete in international markets. Public-private partnerships seem to be determined essentially by the same factors that affect firms in more advanced EU countries. One of the most important is the number of researchers in firms, suggesting that the effectiveness of public funding will be enhanced if complemented with policies that increase the stock of highly qualified human capital at the firm level. Notes: z statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 % level; ** a 5 % level. Note: The optimal number of blocks is 5. The balancing property of the propensity score is satisfied: the mean propensity score is not different for treated and controls in each block. 
